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The island Caribbean serves as a major pipeline between
Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit
narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest illegal
narcotics consumer) . Many countries of the Caribbean have
bilateral agreements with the U.S. and one another. Further,
since the mid 1990s a host of Caribbean nations have signed
"ship rider" agreements with the United States, vastly
improving the potential for cooperation. Yet, no single
region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against the
transshipment of narcotics. Given the scope of the problem,
and the recognition by individual countries of their
limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to
establish a region-wide counternarcotics regime.
This thesis examines the costs and benefits of a region-
wide policy for combating the flow of illicit narcotics
through the Caribbean and into the United States. The thesis
examines past and current regional counternarcotic efforts,
including the Model Maritime Agreement, and the role of the
United States in these efforts. This thesis specifically
addresses the case study of Jamaica, then attempts to apply it
in a broad framework to the entire region. Lastly, this thesis
assesses the potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of
a counternarcotics regime, and the policy implications for
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The island Caribbean serves as the pipeline between
Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit
narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest
illegal narcotics consumer) . It is estimated that 60
percent of the drugs entering the United States pass through
Mexico, with the remaining 40 percent coming through the
Caribbean. 1
Illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the Caribbean
as a result of the availability of drugs, as has the gang
violence associated with narco-traf ticking, and general
crime associated with consumption. Additionally, because of
the small size and budgets of the governments, and the power
of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise. The political
implications of the corruption associated with narco-
trafficking corrode the ability of governments to
effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.
The entire island Caribbean has signed the 1988 United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, and many have bilateral
1 Shelly Emling, "Drug Trade Once Again Targeting S. Florida", Palm
Beach Post, Sunday, March 18, 1998, Al, A22. '
agreements with the United States and one another. Yet, no
single region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against
the transshipment of narcotics. Given the scope of the
problem, and the recognition by individual countries of
their limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to
establish a region-wide counternarcotic plan.
This thesis demonstrates that what is required is a
comprehensive counternarcotics regime featuring the United
States and the island Caribbean. Both the United States and
the Island Caribbean have come to the pragmatic realization
that they must cooperate on counternarcotics in order to
succeed. Given this realization, and the global trend
towards multilateral cooperation and regionalization, the
potential for region-wide cooperation exists, and the United
States should play an integral role in coordinating that
cooperation
.
This thesis examines the costs and benefits of a
region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit
narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States.
In doing this, past and current regional counternarcotic
efforts are examined to include the Model Maritime
Agreement, as well as the role of the United States in these
efforts. This thesis presents a case study of Jamaica as an
individual country with an aggressive counternarcotics
policy that cooperates with the United States, yet cannot
sufficiently combat drugs on its island. The thesis then
broadly applies the findings of the case study across the
entire island Caribbean. Lastly, this thesis tests the
potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of a
counternarcotics regime.
Recently, the United States, numerous Caribbean
leaders, and international and regional organizations have
stated that improved cooperation on counternarcotics is a
necessity. Transnational problems require multinational
solutions, and both the Caribbean and the United States
recognize this to be true. A counternarcotics regime would
further the national interests of both the United States and
countries in the Caribbean, by reducing crime, consumption,
and corruption, thus protecting and strengthening the small
economies and democracies of the Caribbean. Simultaneously,
it would improve the efficiency of the U.S. counterdrug
efforts.
The United States is the only country with the
institutional, economic, and technical resources necessary
for developing and coordinating such a regime, and therefore
must take the lead in its development. To do otherwise
would allow for weak links in the United State's southern
armor, and thus to facilitate increasing levels of drug flow
through the Caribbean pipeline directly into America.
I. DRUG PIPELINE BETWEEN THE AMERICAS
There is near-universal agreement among officials in
various Caribbean, North American, and European capitals
that the top security concerns of the region [Caribbean] are
drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and
money laundering. 2
A . INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Reagan Administration responded to
political and public pressure and declared a "war on drugs,'
and in 1986, the drug problem was elevated to the status of
a "threat to the national security of the United States." 3
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney signaled an end to
Pentagon resistance to involvement in counternarcotics in
mid-1989 by stating that for the Pentagon, "detecting and
countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs
is a high-priority, national security mission." 4
Since that time, the U.S. counternarcotics policy has
focused on three areas: eradication in the host countries,
interdiction in the transit zones, and the reduction of
2 Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Regional Security", Strategic Forum
#102 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 1.
3 J.F. Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and
the War on Drugs (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 41.
4 Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, "DOD and Its Role in the
War Against Drugs" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1989), 1.
domestic demand. The major source countries for cocaine and
opium in Latin America are Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru, while the major transit areas are the countries of
Central America and the Caribbean, as well as Mexico. 5
This thesis is primarily concerned with the role of
transshipment zones, specifically those which comprise the
Caribbean.
The island Caribbean serves as the pipeline between
Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit
narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest
illegal narcotics consumer) . All islands of the Caribbean
are less than 1,500 miles from Bogota, Cali, Medellin, or
Caracas, and less than 2,000 miles from Miami. In addition
to its strategic location, the Caribbean is ideally suited
for clandestine transshipment because it is comprised of
thousands of islands and cays, many of which are extremely
remote, and virtually unmonitored.
The Bahamas alone, for example, are comprised of over
700 islands and 2,000 cays, with one island, Bimini, less
than 40 miles from the Florida Keys. The island Caribbean
is further vulnerable because of the poverty in the region.
5 General Accounting Office, DRUG CONTROL: Long-Standing Problems Hinder
U.S. International Efforts (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1997), 1.
Economics make it impossible for the small individual states
to support large counternarcotics budgets, simultaneously-
making them very susceptible to corruption by wealthy drug
barons
.
Interdiction in the Caribbean has and continues to
receive large degrees of governmental support for a wide
variety of reasons explained below. This is opposed to the
policy of eradication being pursued in supplier countries,
which is unpopular because of the asymmetrical costs borne
by the farmer and peasants, as opposed to the wealthy drug
cartels. An additional disadvantage of eradication is that
it causes a tremendous amount of political problems.
Interdiction of transshipments, however, is less politically
sensitive.
Illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the
Caribbean as a result of the availability of drugs. So too
has the gang violence associated with narco-traf ticking, and
general crime associated with consumption. Additionally,
because of the small size and budgets of the governments,
and the power of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise.
The political implications of the corruption associated with
narco-trafticking corrode the ability of governments to
effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.
The entire island Caribbean has signed the 1988 United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, and many have bilateral
agreements with the United States and one another. Yet, no
single region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against
the transshipment of narcotics. Since the mid 1990s,
however, a host of Caribbean nations have signed "ship
rider" agreements with the United States, vastly improving
the potential for cooperation. Given the scope of the
problem, and the recognition by individual countries of
their limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to
establish a region-wide counternarcotic plan.
1. Thesis Statement
My thesis is that individual countries in the Caribbean
cannot, on their own, effectively combat the flow of
narcotics through the region. What is needed is a
comprehensive counternarcotics regime featuring the United
States and the island Caribbean. The United St.ates is the
only country with the financial, institutional, and
technical resources necessary for establishing, organizing,
and implementing such a plan. The potential for region-
wide cooperation exists, and the United States should play
an integral role in coordinating that cooperation. Further,
the development of a regional counternarcotics regime with
strong legislation, mutually supportive policies, and
intelligence sharing would enable the Caribbean and the
United States to significantly affect the level of narco-
trafficking through the region.
This thesis will examine the costs and benefits of a
region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit
narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States.
In doing this, past and current regional counternarcotic
efforts will be examined to include the Model Maritime
Agreement, as will the role of the United States in these
efforts. Specifically, this thesis will present a case
study of Jamaica, then attempt to broadly apply the findings
across the entire island Caribbean. Lastly, this thesis
will seek to test for the potential for enhanced cooperation
in the form of a counternarcotics regime.
2. Definition of the Caribbean
For the purpose of this thesis, the Caribbean is
defined as the islands of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic
Ocean. This includes all islands between the Bahamas and
Trinidad and Tobago, the Yucatan Channel, and the eastern
side of Barbados. As such, Belize, Guyana, and Suriname
are not included in my definition. However, because in some
circumstances they are considered Caribbean, they may appear
in quotes or in statistics. While this thesis will focus
primarily upon the principal transit countries, it is
applicable to all states of the region, because no country
has been left unaffected by the narcotics trade and its side
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Source: Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the
Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), no page given.
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B. SIGNIFICANCE
The United States and the Caribbean share a special
relationship because of geography, history, and economics.
The role of the Caribbean in narcotics transshipment, and
the threat that it poses to Caribbean security cannot be
overstated. It is estimated that 60 percent of the drugs
entering America pass through Mexico, with the remaining 4
percent coming through the Caribbean. 6 However, these
numbers can be slightly misleading because much of the drugs
entering through Mexico must first cross portions of the
Caribbean.
In November 1994, Barry McCaffrey, the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, declared Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands to be High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) . 7 According to the General
Accounting Office, by 1996 Puerto Rico had become the major
entry point for cocaine moving through the Eastern
6 Shelly Ending, "Drug Trade Once Again Targeting S. Florida", Palm
Beach Post, Sunday, March 18, 1998, Al, A22. Emiling's numbers are from
the United Nations Drug Control Program. Just one year earlier the
General Accounting Office reported the numbers to be 70 percent and 30
percent, showing the increasing importance of the Caribbean to drug
trafficking. General Accounting Office, DRUG CONTROL: U.S. Interdiction
Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GA0/NSIAD-96-119) (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1996), 3.
7 U.S. Congress. House. War on Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: Fact
or Fiction?, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996. Federal Drug Control Budget
brief given by Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1996), 46.
11
Caribbean. Further, in 1994 Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands accounted for 26 percent of the documented attempts
to smuggle cocaine into the U.S. 8
On 11 May 1998, the New York Times stated that law
enforcement officials estimate that as much as one third of
the 300 metric tons of cocaine that annually enter the
United States is transported by Dominican Republic drug
traffickers. While the Colombian cartels used to jealously
guard every stage of the cocaine business, they now work
with the Dominicans, vastly expanding the role that the
Caribbean plays in the drug trade. Accordingly, the
Dominicans' share of the cocaine trade has more than doubled
since the early 1990s. 9
Because of the success of interdicting illegal air
traffic, shipping is becoming increasingly important. The
Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that 70-80 percent of
all narcotics trade is shipped on commercial and
noncommercial sea going vessels. 10 This further highlights
the crucial role that the Caribbean plays as the drug
8 GAO, U.S. Interdiction Efforts Decline, 4-5.
9 Clifford Krauss and Larry Rother, "Dominican Drug Traffickers Tighten
Grip on the Northeast", The New York Times, VOL. CXKVII No. 51,154, 11
May 1998, Al, A17.
10 Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 10.
12
noncommercial sea going vessels. 10 This further highlights
the crucial role that the Caribbean plays as the drug
pipeline between the Americas. From 1984 to 1986, the level
of narco-traf ticking through the region increased by 8,265
percent. 11 "Latin American countries supply one-third of
the heroin, perhaps 80 percent of the marijuana, and all the
cocaine currently used in the United States, representing
more than three-fourths of the U.S. drug market...." 12
Further, according to the New York Times , "...in fiscal year
1997, the United States Custom Service in Florida, the main
point of entry for drugs from the Caribbean, confiscated




The threat posed by drugs and its associated dangers
are four pronged, and best explained by the list below from
"Caribbean Regional Security."
1. These operations have multiple consequences and
implications — such as marked increases in crime,
10 Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 10.
11 Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle Worrell ed.
Democracy in the Caribbean (Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University Press,
1993;, 231.
12 Michael A. Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1994), 132.
13 Krauss and Rother, "Dominican Drug Dealers", A17.
13
4. The sovereignty of many countries is severely tested
and subject to infringement, by both state and non-
state actors, because of drugs. 14
The potential threat of political instability resulting
from governmental corruption and narcoterrorism, as well as
the significance of the domestic drug problem, make a
region-wide effort critical. Additionally, in the 1997
National Security Strategy, President Clinton stated that
improving international cooperation, and cost and burden
sharing in counternarcotics is a priority. As a result,
strengthening the regional counter-drug effort is a priority
for the advancement of the national interests of America.
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will present a single case study of Jamaica
as an individual country with an aggressive counternarcotics
policy that cooperates with the United States, yet because
of its small budget, large coastline, and weak
counternarcotics legislation, cannot sufficiently combat
drugs on the island. This case study will examine the
efforts put forth by the Jamaican government, their
successes and failures, the role of the U.S. in providing
equipment, training, and funds, the shortfalls of a single
14 Griffith, "Caribbean Regional Security", 2.
14
nation effort, and the potential for integrated regional
cooperation. Jamaica's role in regional cooperation was
evidenced by the opening, in December 1996, of the Caribbean
Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center in Jamaica.
The first class to graduate from the two-week course had 25
students, 13 of whom were Jamaican, with the remaining 12
being from nine other Caribbean islands.
This case study will attempt to use Jamaica as a
specific case, then apply it as a general model for the
entire Caribbean. Inherently there are pitfalls in using a
single case and trying to apply it broadly. However, I
believe that because of Jamaica's broad interaction
throughout the Caribbean, its relations within the region,
and with the United States, it will be a suitable case
study. In examining the potential for cooperation I will
highlight problem areas such as issues of national
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
1 . Competing Hypotheses
This thesis will examine two competing hypotheses. The
first hypothesis is that because of current widescale
regional interaction through a broad spectrum of political,
economic, and social ties, a framework for regional
cooperation on counternarcotics does exist. Further,
15
because of the scope of the problem, and the recognition
that the region does not have the physical assets or
financial resources to combat the problem alone, the
Caribbean will realize that the benefits of an increased
region-wide policy outweigh the potential costs of such
cooperation.
The second, and competing hypothesis, is that a
counternarcotics regime in the Caribbean is not possible,
and the current level of cooperation will stagnate rather
than deepen. This is because the nations of the Caribbean
will perceive the costs of cooperation to outweigh the
benefits. This hypothesis posits that issues such as
national sovereignty, and territorial integrity outweigh the
benefits of cooperation on counternarcotics.
D. CONCLUSION
In analyzing the potential for cooperation, the thesis
will examine regime theory, methods of cooperation, and the
importance of international organizations. Specifically,
this thesis will examine the role of regimes in facilitating
international cooperation as advanced by Robert 0. Keohane
and Andrew Axline. 15 Additionally, Lisa Martin's methods of
15 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),
16
cooperation will be utilized to explain three potential
paths towards cooperation. 16
Recently, the U.S., numerous Caribbean leaders, and
international and regional organizations have stated that
improved cooperation on counternarcotics is a necessity.
Transnational problems require multinational solutions, and
both the Caribbean and the United States recognize this to
be true. This thesis will attempt to validate the assertion
that enhanced cooperation on counternarcotics is not only a
necessity, but that it is also possible and desirable.
and Andrew Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation:
Comparative Case Studies (London: Printer Publishers, 1994).
16 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic
Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
17
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II. THE DRUG WAR
The United States must continue assisting
major drug-producing and transit countries that
demonstrate the political will to attack illegal
drug production and trafficking. 17
A . U.S. STRATEGY
The 1996 U.S. Drug Control Strategy has five stated
goals, the first of which is to motivate America's youth to
reject illegal drugs and substance abuse. Second, is to
increase the safety of U.S. citizens by reducing drug-
related violence and crime. Third, is to reduce the health
and welfare costs resulting from illegal drug use. Fourth,
is to shield America' s air, land, and sea frontiers from the
drug threat. The fifth and final goal is to break foreign
and domestic sources of supply. 18 Of the five
aforementioned goals, the military is primarily concerned
with the last two. These two objectives are covered in the
interdiction and international support portion of the
counternarcotics plan and budget. Anti-narcotics spending
is broken down into four functional areas: domestic demand
17 United States Department of State, Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control
Cooperation: A Counternarcotics Alliance for the Hemisphere, Section V.,
6. Obtained via the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
webpage. located at: www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov
18 General Accounting Office, Long-Standing Problems, 1.
19
reduction, domestic law enforcement, international support,
and interdiction.
The total U.S. counternarcotics budget for fiscal year
1997 was $13.8 billion dollars. 19 The largest portion of
this budget went to treatment, followed by corrections,
investigations, state and local efforts, prevention,
interdiction, prosecutions, research and development,
international, intelligence, and other law enforcement, in
that order. 20 To put things into perspective, the
international drug control budget in fiscal year 1995 was
only $850 million, 6 percent of the total anti-drug budget.
That is the value equivalent of 8.5 metric tons of cocaine.
There are single drug busts that are larger and worth more
than that. 21
On 6 June 1996, the Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, Barry McCaffrey testified to Congress
that illegal drugs had cost the U.S. $300 billion dollars in
the 1990s. During that same period, drugs caused no less
19 According to the GAO, U.S. federal drug control spending is divided
into four areas: demand reduction, domestic law enforcement,
international, and interdiction. In fiscal year 1997, $400 million has
been slated for international, while $1.4 billion has been funded for
interdiction.
20 U.S. Congress. House, War on Drugs, 47-50.
21 Ibid., 50.
20
than 100,000 deaths, 500,000 emergency room cases, and drug
use was involved in one-third of all homicide cases. 22
B. CONSUMPTION & CORRUPTION
Demand for illicit narcotics in Europe is also
increasing, especially for Latin American cocaine. Further,
illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the Caribbean as a
result of the availability of drugs. This is especially
true of the primary transit states of the Bahamas, Belize,
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Puerto Rico, and
Trinidad and Tobago. 23 This rise in consumption is caused
largely by the spillover effect. The spillover effect means
that as drugs transit through a country, a certain amount of
them are consumed by that society.
In addition to a rise in consumption of illicit
narcotics in the Caribbean, there also has been a rise in
the level of gang violence associated with narco-
trafficking, especially in Jamaica. The cost of controlling
general crime associated with consumption, and treating the
growing number of addicts, is placing additional strains on
22 Ibid., 13.
2 ^ Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics
Phenomenon" in, Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, and Humberto Garcia Muniz ed.
Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996), 183.
21
the small size and budgets of the governments, and the power
of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise.
For example, in March 1985, the Prime Minister of the
Turks and Caicos Islands, Norman Saunders, and two of his
ministers were arrested in Miami, Florida, for facilitating
the transshipment of narcotics into the United States. 24
Saunders and all involved were convicted in July 1985, due
to overwhelming evidence including videotapes of Saunders
accepting bribes from undercover DEA agents. What is
particularly significant about this example is that it
occurred three years after the commencement of Operation
Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) , demonstrating the
ability of narco-traf fickers to penetrate the highest level
of even those governments formally committed to stopping the
flow of drugs through the region. 25 In 1987, due to drug
trafficking related activities, 51 Trinidad and Tobago
policemen were suspended and the Commissioner of Police
resigned. In March 1992, a Royal Bahamas Police Force
(RBPF) sergeant, who worked with the Bahamas special drug
24 Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed., Democracy in the Caribbean, 230.
25 OPBAT, signed in 1982, is a joint U.S. and Bahamian and Turks and
Caicos Islands effort to interdict narco-traf fickers . OPBAT involves
close coordination to stop air, land, and sea shipping, allows for "hot
pursuit", ' has joint manning of law enforcement bases, and has a ship
rider agreement. The Bahamas were the first island to give permission
for "hot pursuit" of suspects into their territorial waters.
22
(RBPF) sergeant, who worked with the Bahamas special drug
court, was arrested for possession and intent to supply 6
kilograms of cocaine. 26
Lastly, for example, the Commissioner of Police of
Antigua and Barbuda makes $2,000 a month, a Barbuda senior
customs official makes only $483 monthly, while a pilot
flying narcotics may make over $100,000 in a few hours. 27
In comparing the income of the police or the customs
official with that of the pilot, it becomes clear that there
is a huge disparity, even at the base level of the drug war.
It is in this enormous difference that lies the power to
corrupt
.
Security, according to Professor Ivelaw Griffith, means
"the protection and preservation of a people's freedom from
external military attacks and coercion, freedom from
internal subversion and from the erosion of cherished
political, economic and social values.
"
28 The political
implications of the corruption associated with narco-
trafficking corrode the ability of governments to
effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.
26 Griffith, Caribbean Manifestations, 188-189.
27 Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed. Democracy in the Caribbean, 230.
28 Griffith, Caribbean Manifestations, 181.
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Further, it distorts politicians' views, and can lead to
widespread cynicism among the populace, further undermining
the ability of the government to react to national security
threats.
Thus, narco-traf fickers pose a threat to the security,
sovereignty, and legitimacy of Caribbean governments.
Additionally, because of the aforementioned factors, and the
negative image associated with it, tourism has suffered in
some of the islands. Therefore, drugs stress the small
economies of the Caribbean for numerous reasons including:
the loss of tourism resulting from bad press due to drug
trafficking and the related violence; cost of
rehabilitation; increasing cost of maintaining interdiction
forces; investigations and incarceration; as well as lost
production due to drug problems in the work environment. In
essence, drugs are choking the society from the outside and
draining it from within. As a result, the Caribbean nations
have a clear interest in stopping the flow of narcotics
through the region.
C. MULTILAYERED & MULTINATIONAL RESPONSE?
Because of the international scope of the drug problem
and its multidimensional nature, a successful drug policy
needs to be multilayered. In other words, countries need to
have strong national policies that simultaneously address
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demand reduction, interdiction, eradication, and legislation
and prosecution. In addition, they need regional and
international plans since illegal narcotics are an
international problem. Lastly, a successful policy also
needs to incorporate numerous outside actors, both state and
nonstate, because the problem is too large and too expensive
for a single country to manage on its own.
In order for the drug control strategy to be
successful, all aspects of the plan must be implemented
concurrently with both force and dedication, following a
carefully thought out long-term plan. At the source country
level, eradication of drug crops is extremely important
because it eliminates drugs before they enter the pipeline.
Starting in 1993 President Clinton announced that the
primary source countries should be the focus of the U.S.
international drug control effort. 29
However, despite some of the success of the
eradication programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico,
and Peru, the number of hectares dedicated to producing
illicit narcotics continues to rise. Between 1988 and 1995,
56,000 hectares of coca plants were destroyed, while
29 Presidential Decision Directive 14, signed November 3, 1993. PDD-14
switched the focus of international support towards eradication in the
three primary Latin American supplier countries of Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru.
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simultaneously the number of hectares under cultivation for
coca in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru increased from 186,240
to 214, 800. 30 Thus, despite eradication efforts, the amount
of land dedicated to growing illicit narcotics is at best
constant, and may even be increasing, not decreasing.
In addition, thousands of hectares are dedicated to the
harvesting of opium poppy in Mexico, and especially in
Colombia where production and exportation is rapidly
expanding. Colombian cartels are rapidly entering the opium
market because of the increasing demand, the high profit
margin, and relative value per shipment. In the same way
that cocaine shipments are smaller (thus easier to smuggle)
and more valuable than marijuana, heroin shipments are
smaller and more valuable than cocaine. According to The
Palm Beach Post , the U.S. Customs Service in Florida
reported only two heroin seizures between 1978-1988.
However, that number rose to 29 in 1996 alone, and to 45 in
1997. Further, unlike heroin in the 1970s that was only 10
percent pure, Colombian heroin is 90 percent pure, making it
more addictive. 31
30 General Accounting Office, Long-Standing Problems, 6.
31 Ending', "Drug Trade Targeting S. Florida", A22
.
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The policy of eradication being pursued in supplier
countries frequently is unpopular because of the
asymmetrical costs borne by the farmer and peasants, as
opposed to the wealthy drug cartels. Hundreds of thousands
of campesinos work in the coca and opium fields, and
eradication of these crops would devastate the economies of
supplier countries. Therefore, much of the success of
eradication programs relies upon the support of the local
government, their national police forces and military, and
the development of alternative cash crops. According to the
U.S. Department of State, "since large-scale eradication,
however, is not politically feasible in many countries, we
must also aggressively attack drug refining and
transshipment...." 32 Thus, while eradication is important, it
is not a panacea for the U.S. drug problem.
Aside from eradication, which falls under international
support in the 1996 Drug Control Strategy, the other area of
active overseas involvement is interdiction. The area of
interdiction that this thesis is concerned with is in the
transit or transshipment zones of the Caribbean. Despite
the noteworthy efforts of the Colombian National Police, and
32 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 4.
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their counterparts in other producer countries, tremendous
quantities of narcotics still leave South America every day.
Accordingly, the United States and the rest of the world
need to aggressively patrol and intercept drug trafficking
in the crucial air and sea-lanes of the Caribbean.
Though Presidential Decision Directive-14 shifted the
focus of the U.S. Drug War, the previously noted rise in the
hectares dedicated to coca development, coupled with the
enormity of the world-wide demand for narcotics makes
interdiction extremely important. For the national and
international counternarcotics policies to be effective, all
aspects need to be strong and efficient.
However, since the signing of PDD-14, interdiction has
suffered measurable setbacks. "Between 1993 and the first
six months of 1995, the transit zone 'disruption rate' — the
ability of U.S. forces to seize or otherwise turn back drug
shipments — dropped 53 percent, from 435.1 kilograms per day
to 205.2 kilograms..." 33 The disruption rate has been affected
by decreased funding for interdiction, which has resulted in
reduced "steaming days" for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard,
reduced "flight hours" for aircraft, reduced radar coverage,
33 U.S. Congress. Senate, Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on
Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Drug Policy, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995),
13.
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and the reassignment and mothballing of assets formerly used
for interdiction. Accordingly, those monies and resources
dedicated to interdiction need to be utilized as efficiently
and effectively as possible.
One way to make the U.S. anti-traf ficking policy
stronger would be to bolster the ability of small Caribbean
countries to monitor and patrol their own territorial
waters. The most politically acceptable, cost efficient,
and effective policy would be one which created a region
wide counternarcotics effort or regime. In other words, a
series of agreements which develop a framework for inter-
regional cooperation at the highest level. This region-wide
policy should include the entire island Caribbean, as well
as the United States. There need not be a single force or
a combined military. Rather, there needs to be an
integrated series of radar facilities, intelligence sharing,
and either joint patrols, or permission for "hot pursuit" of
suspects into neighboring territorial waters or airspace.
Additionally, the region should have strong legislation with
stringent anti-drug and money laundering laws, and there
should be region-wide extradition agreements.
29
1 . Current Cooperation
A framework for widespread regional cooperation already
exists as evidenced by the numerous regional and
international agreements of which regional members are
signatories. Much of the Caribbean has signed Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with the United States, to
include: Antigua-Barbuda, the 'Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, St. Kitts-
Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. These agreements provide
for joint training, interdiction, asset and intelligence
sharing, extradition, x hot pursuit, ' and equipment and
technical support. 34 Additionally, some agreements allow
for host nations to place police or military personnel
aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels. Once embarked, these
personnel can give permission for the vessel to board, make
arrests, and confiscate drugs while in Caribbean territorial
waters
.
Further, many of the countries have bilateral '
agreements (BILATs) with one another, for example Jamaica-
Cuba, Mexico-Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela, just
to name a few. The Bahamas, Great Britain, and the United
States entered into a multilateral arrangement in July 1990,
34 Griffith, Caribbean Regional Security, 4
30
which effectively expanded OPBAT's operational network.
Other regional and international efforts include the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Association of
Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) , Caribbean Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Committee (CLEIC) , United
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNAC) , Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) , OAS Money Laundering
Experts Group, and the United Nations International Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) . Lastly, although not a
counternarcotics and security organization, the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) , shows that wide-scale
interdependence and cooperation already exist in the
Caribbean.
The Caribbean Community and Common Market came into
existence in 1973, with the signing of the Treaty of
Chaguaramas . The initial members were Anguilla, Dominica,
Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
Montserrat, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and
Tobago. 35 Since that time membership has expanded to
include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
35 Sandra W. Meditz, and Dennis M. Hanratty ed., Islands of the
Caribbean Commonwealth: A Regional Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989), 654-655.
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Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, showing the existing
depth of current integration. 36 Despite the challenges
posed by Jamaica and Grenada's socialist experiments, and
numerous other problems, CARICOM has marched on for 25
years. The nations of the Caribbean enjoy a relationship of
complex interdependence, and are enjoined in numerous
arrangements addressing a wide variety of issues.
Formulating a new regime specifically to address narcotics
trafficking is a logical progression for the nations of the
Caribbean.
By cooperating on the seas, in the air, and on the
ground, the entire region would benefit because there would
be a synergistic effect from the combination of all the
individual countries 1 assets. This would make it far more
difficult for narco-traf fickers to find and exploit weak
links. Currently, efforts to stop drug trafficking in the
Caribbean are only as good as the weakest link. This is
because if the Bahamas or Jamaica increase the pressure on
trafficking, then the traffickers will simply move their
business to a country with less capable counternarcotic
forces and more lenient laws. However, if the entire
Caribbean has the same counternarcotic policies and laws,
36 World Bank Press Release, "World Bank President At CARICOM Summit,
March 5, 1996, 1.
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and cooperate militarily with the United States and one
another, the weak link will largely be mitigated. Drug
trafficking is like a disease; it attacks the weakest area
and exploits its vulnerabilities. Increased cooperation
could reduce these weaknesses.
Because the costs of fighting the drug war are so high,
it makes further sense to combine the U.S. efforts with
those of other nations in a unified counternarcotics policy
designed to reduce the level of narco-trafticking through
the Caribbean. This policy would be consistent with the
stated U.S. counternarcotics goal of sharing the cost burden
of the drug war with other countries and multilateral
organizations. Further, this policy would also conform to
President Clinton' s foreign policy plan of "Engagement and
Enlargement'' . By limiting corruption and strengthening
legislation throughout the region, the policy would also
help to reinforce the democratic institutions of the
Caribbean, thereby helping to improve hemispheric security
through fostering political stability. An additional
benefit to this plan is that it could be a symmetrical
policy, as opposed to the U.S. -imposed asymmetrical policies
of the past. Making the plan as symmetrical as possible
would increase its popularity in region while reducing the
image that it was imposed from the North.
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The individual island states of the Caribbean are
very small, and have extremely limited human, institutional,
and economic resources to devote to counternarcotics . These
limited resources compete with widespread poverty and other
competing demands, further straining the capability of
countries to respond to a vital national security threat.
For example, in 1990, Barbuda and Antigua budgeted only $2
million (USD) for counternarcotics, and actually spent
less. 37 In Table 2.1, derived from a Joint Interagency Task
Force East (JIATF-E) table, it is clear just how limited
some of the counternarcotic forces are in the Caribbean.
Table 2.1
Selected Eastern Caribbean Maritime Interdiction Assets,
1995
Nation Interdiction Assets




3 patrol boats, 6 aircraft,
4 helicopters
Antigua/Barbuda 3 boats
St. Kitts 4 boats
Montserrat 1 patrol Craft with 1 crew
Dominica 4 boats
St. Lucia 4 boats, 2 of which are
damaged
St. Vincent 4 boats
Barbados 5 boats, 1 possibly damaged
Grenada 4 boats
Trinidad and Tobago large, medium, and small
platforms
Source: Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E)
,
contained in GAO, U.S. Interdiction in Caribbean Decline,
10.
37 Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed. , Democracy in the Caribbean, 230.
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Source: Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E)
,
contained in GAO, U.S. Interdiction in Caribbean Decline,
10.
As the largest spender, the United States will spend
approximately $1.5 billion in interdiction and international
support in fiscal year 1997, while the annual world drug
trade is estimated to be over $500 billion. These numbers
show that in order for the U.S. policies to be effective,
every dollar needs to be used as effectively and efficiently
as possible. The flow of drugs through the United States
will never be completely stopped, but it can be slowed down.
Similarly, corruption will never be completely stamped out,
but a regional plan including similar legislation and
policies would make it far more difficult for corruption to
have the wide-scale influence that it has today.
D . CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as evidenced above, both the United
States and the Caribbean have a significant interest in
reducing the flow of drugs through the region. The United
States and the Caribbean both suffer from consumption
problems, as well as from increasing levels of violence, and
from the tremendous costs associated with treating addicts
of illegal narcotics. Because drugs affect both the United
35
there is great potential for wide-scale and far ranging
cooperation.
In order to have a region-wide policy, there has to be
a region-wide acceptance of a problem which, as will be
demonstrated in Chapter IV, now exists. Because of this
acceptance, the opportunity to initiate a U.S. -led
comprehensive region-wide counternarcotics policy should not
be lost. It is clearly in the national interest of both the
United States and the nations of the Caribbean. Lastly,
this policy would be consistent with the U.S. government's
foreign policy and would advance its national interests.
Kenneth McNeil, a Jamaican governmental minister,
stated that the measures taken by the individual Caribbean
islands "fall short of a regional response which will be
necessary in the development of a sustained Caribbean
initiative. The Caribbean countries do not possess either
the facilities or the resources to achieve this most
important objective." 38 Cooperation in the Caribbean is
further possible because of the good relations of most of
the region with the United States and with one another, as
3** Kenneth McNeil, "Development of Cocaine Trafficking in Jamaica",
keynote address at World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for
Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, 1993, quoted in Jorge I.
Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle Worrell ed . Democracy in the
Caribbean : Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 233.
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evidenced by CARICOM, and a host of other bilateral and
multilateral arrangements. Further, it is consistent with
the international and hemispheric trend towards
interdependence, and regionalization. The region, to
include the United States, must form a region-wide policy to
coordinate efforts against the transshipment of illegal
narcotics. To do otherwise is to allow for weak links in
the United State's southern armor, and thus to facilitate
increasing levels of drug flow through the Caribbean
pipeline directly into America.
37
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III. JAMAICAN CASE STUDY
...All governments must recognize that
international stability and national sovereignty
will never be secure as long as the drug trade
prospers. The drug trade survives by a strategy
of corrupt and divide. 39
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Jamaican Efforts and Issues
On 28 February 1997, President William J. Clinton
announced that Jamaica, as a major narcotics-producing and
transit country, had again been certified as a country that
is cooperating and complying with the 1988 United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. 40 Though relations between the
United States and the government of Jamaica have not always
been cordial, Jamaica has been certified for the last 12
years in a row.
However, despite numerous successes, U.S .—Jamaican
joint counternarcotic efforts have not always succeeded, nor
have they maintained their momentum and initiative. Some
39 incsr, 4.
40 INCSR, XXIV. The 1998 INCSR was not yet available for public use
when this thesis was written. Accordingly there are no statistics for
1997-98 contained in this chapter. However, Jamaica was again
certified in 1998, reflecting continuing cooperation.
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years there have been setbacks in the number of cannabis
crops destroyed, arrests made, and drugs confiscated.
Nonetheless, Jamaica has remained a consistent ally of the
United States in the war against drugs.
This chapter will examine the nature of U . S . -Jamaican
relations, the level of cooperation, and areas of conflict.
The question to be answered is whether the United States and
Jamaica can cooperate on counternarcotics to an even further
extent, and if so, how and why. Finally, if the United
States and Jamaica can further cooperate, despite
disagreements, what are the possible implications for the
rest of the Caribbean?
Jamaica is in a unique situation as one of the very few
countries in the world that is both a major producer and a
major transit area of illicit narcotics. By definition, a
major producer of cannabis is a country in which 5,000
hectares or more of illicit cannabis are annually harvested
or cultivated. A major transit country is one through which
a significant amount of illegal drugs transit enroute to the
United States. 41 In the Jamaican case, the drug is
primarily cocaine, although Jamaica, like the rest of the
Caribbean, is registering increasing levels of heroin
41 INSCR, 35.
40
traffic. 42 The other countries in the Caribbean that have
been identified as either major producers or transit areas
are Aruba, The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. 43 As
such, Jamaica faces a difficult problem because it is a
producer and a conduit, as well as a consumer.
B. ERADICATION AND ARRESTS
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, marijuana is produced














Source: Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the
Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege (University Park: Penn
State University Press, 1997), 35.
42 Ibid., 35
43 Ibid., vii. Although Cuba is strategically located for drug trade,
and despite credible reports that traffickers use Cuban waters and
airspace, according to the U.S. State Department, such activity has not




Indica and sinsemilla are the most common local variants,
and grow four to six harvestable crops annually. 44
Eradication efforts in Jamaica are hampered because the
cannabis crops are frequently intermixed with legitimate
legal crops, making detection very difficult from the air.
Further, the government of Jamaica opposes aerial
eradication of cannabis for both environmental and political
reasons. Accordingly, cannabis crops, once detected, must
be destroyed manually, which is an arduous and inefficient
process
.
The Government of Jamaica eradicated 473 hectares of
cannabis in 1996, opposed to 695 hectares in 1995.
Eradication efforts in 1996 were slowed down however, during
a three-month period when Jamaica's helicopters provided by
the United States, were grounded by a U.S. safety-of-flight
order. During the three months, eradicators continued their
efforts and were transported to sites by truck. This
however, was slow, and some plots located on mountainous
ridges were inaccessible by truck. 45 The table below
derived from the International Narcotics Control Strategy






45 Ibid. i 191.
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through 1996. An important item to note is the significant
reduction in potential yield that has occurred over the 11-
year period.
Table 3.1
Jamaican Cannabis Statistics, 1986-1996
Calendar
Year




527 305 308 744 389 950 1220 280 607 680 2600
Eradication
(Hectares)
473 695 692 456 811 833 1030 1510 650 650 2200
Cultivation
(Hectares)




356 206 208 502 263 641 825 189 405 460 1755
Source: INSCR, 195.
One of the primary reasons for the overall reduction in
potential yield is that the level of harvestable cultivation
has been reduced by over half since 1985. Huge plots of up
to 50 acres were used to grow cannabis. Now because of
eradication efforts, remote one-acre plots are the norm.
Accordingly, the success of eradication has forced marijuana
cultivators to less fertile grounds, and to smaller, less
efficient plots.
In addition to a slight reduction in the amount of
cannabis that was eradicated in 1996, there was a slight
reduction in cocaine seizures, and drug-related arrests.
There was, however, a significant increase in the amount of
marijuana seized, and a slight increase in heroin seizures
43
as well. "According to DEA, Jamaican police




In 1996 the number of drug related arrests dropped
slightly below the number from 1995, but remained
significantly higher than those of the previous few years.
According to the U.S. Department of State, "[r]eported drug
arrests in 1996 included 2,996 Jamaicans and 267 foreigners
for a total of 3,263 arrests, which was slightly reduced
from the total arrests in 1995 (3,705)." 47
One of the problems that the Jamaican government
encounters in its war against drugs is the nature of
marijuana use in Jamaican culture. Rastafarians, a
significant cultural group both in terms of size and
influence, use marijuana for socioreligious purposes.
Furthermore, they state that it is an herb and not a drug,
citing numerous biblical passages to validate their
assertions. Accordingly, marijuana use in Jamaica is 'widely
accepted in large segments of Jamaican society.
46 Ibid., 189. The 1996 INSCR said that cooperation between the United
States and Jamaican law enforcement was at the highest level in five
years. Ae cited in GAO, U.S. Interdiction Efforts Decline, 9.
47 Ibid., 191.
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However, drug trafficking has increased the overall
availability not only of marijuana, but also cocaine, crack,
and to a lesser degree, heroin. This is caused by a
spillover effect whereby a certain percentage of the drugs
passing through a society are consumed by that society. One
of the documented downfalls of this phenomenon is a rise in
the level of crime associated with narcotraf ficking and













































For each of the 13 years between 1983—1995 Jamaica
recorded an increase in nearly every category of crime, with
a rise in the total number of incidents of nearly 10,000.
Table 3.2, derived from Ivelaw Griffith's Drugs and Security
in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege , shows this
situation quite clearly.
Table 3.2








1983 483 825 681 22,030 1,544 4,250 29,813
1986 449 NR 729 23,949 1,584 4,123 30,834
1987 442 1,007 894 22,055 1,563 4,395 30,356
1988 414 1,118 812 19,769 1,533 3,533 27,179
1989 439 1,090 651 19,684 1,393 4,086 27,343
1990 542 1,006 12,375 16,278 1,297 5,433 37,031
1991 561 1,091 10,698 16,476 1,661 6,711 37,198
1992 629 1,108 12,368 14,521 1,721 6,298 36,645
1993 653 1,121 12,710 15,454 2,039 6,915 38,892
1994 690 1,070 13,855 14,453 1,853 5,859 37,780
1995 780 1,605 14,883 13,766 2,429 6,074 39,537
*This total is a total of the categories represented not a
total of all crimes in the country. Data for 1984-1985 was
not available.
Source: Griffith, Drugs and Security, 121.
As a result, the Jamaican government faces numerous
obstacles in its counternarcotics efforts. Nonetheless, it
continues to eradicate cannabis, make arrests, and in
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general support the United States, the United Nations, and
other counternarcotic institutions in their war against
drugs
.




The drug war in Jamaica is principally directed by two
entities. The first is the National Council On Drug Abuse
(NCDA) , whose functions include domestic monitoring,
prevention, and education concerning illicit narcotics. The
second entity is the Ministry of National Security and
Justice, whose functions include formulating and
implementing operational policies to suppress and eradicate
drugs, coordinating the direction of all anti-drug
activities, and encouraging regional and interregional
cooperation. 48
2 . Counternarcotics Forces
a) The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF)
At the tactical level Jamaica's counternarcotics
effort is focused around two institutions: The Jamaican
Defense Force (JDF) , and the Jamaican Constabulary Force
48 Information obtained from the United Nations International Narcotics
Control Board Internet site, Jamaica section. Http: //www.undcp. org.
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(JCF) . In 1992, the JDF' s personnel strength was just under
2,000, and the JCF was manned at 5601. 49 As such, the JDF
is the largest military in the English speaking Caribbean
and an important institution regionally. The JDF became
operational in July, 1962, just two weeks before Jamaica's
independence from Great Britain. 50 Ivelaw Griffith writes
that
,
xx [a] lthough the JDF had been designed for external
security, the absence of any x clear and present' external
danger, coupled with the rise in domestic violence led to a
metamorphosis in the army's security operation.
"
51
Accordingly, beginning in 1969, the JDF began to serve more
domestic security functions.
The JDF, according to its mission statement, is
charged with the defense of Jamaica and the maintenance of
order. 52 The second half of that statement clearly
highlights the civil-military relationship in Jamaica. The
JDF received support in its development from Britain,
Canada, and the United States. Griffith notes that "[u]p to
1977, Jamaica was the only Commonwealth Caribbean country to
49 Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 36.
50 Griffith, The Quest, 133.
51 Ibid. , '133.
52 Jamaican Information Service (JIS) located on the Internet.
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get military assistance under the IMET (International
Military Education and Training) Program." 53 In addition to
IMET and other development funds, the United States also
materially helped Jamaica establish its modest Air Wing and
Coast Guard.
While Jamaica neither produces military arms, nor
conducts military-related research and development, it does
have one of the most significant military inventories in the
region. Jamaica primarily uses equipment produced by
Britian, Canada, and the United States, with the emphasis
recently on the United States. The Air Wing, consisting
primarily of Beechcraft-like aircraft and light helicopters,
is not equipped for combat operations. However, it is
equipped to conduct search and rescue (SAR), ground force
liaison, transport missions, as well as counternarcotic
operations
.
The Coast Guard, a branch of the JDF, is heavily
involved in the country's counternarcotics effort, as well
as being charged with SAR, and environmental and fishery
protection. Michael Morris, in his book Caribbean Maritime
Security , has ranked Jamaica's Coast Guard as a second rank
coast guard (one being the lowest and three being the
53 Griffith, The Quest, 134.
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highest) . Rank two implies that the JDFCG can perform
irregular and spotty law enforcement, usually generating
from a single base. 54 However, Morris's rankings were based
on 1992 data, and since that time, Jamaica has opened at
least one new base, located in the Pedro Cays, and has
continued to improve its capabilities. 55 Rear Admiral
Peter Brady, the Chief of Staff of the JDF is considered to
be one of the most professional and finest officers in the
Caribbean. 56 Writing in Proceedings of the U.S. Naval
Institute , Commander Adams addresses the professionalism of
the JDFCG when he states that:
The JDFCG officer corps epitomizes
professionalism in the Caribbean. Many of the
officers are trained at the British military
academy at Sandhurst, and most, after transfer
from the main body of the JDF, prefer to remain in
the Coast Guard. Most are skilled seamen,
knowledgeable engineers, and strong leaders who
seek to improve their skills and equipment. 57
54 Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 29.
55 The Pedro Cays sit astride the key sea corridor from Colombia to
Jamaica. Construction began on the Pedro Cays base in 1996.
56 Information obtained during a phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy,
Caribbean Program Officer, State Department INL bureau on 16 March 1998.
57 Commander Michael A. Adams, "In Our Nations' Interests," Proceedings
of the U.S. Naval Institute No. 116 (March 1990): 104 quoted in Ivelaw
L. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and
Promise in Subordinate States (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1993), Pg. 139.
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b) The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF)
The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) was formed
in 1867, nearly one hundred years before independence.
However, the JCF has been plagued with poor training, low
budgets, poor salaries, and insufficient manpower to address
its workload. Additionally, it has developed a bad
reputation for violations of civil and political rights. 58
Americas Watch "documented an average of 217 police killings
annually between 1979 and 1986.
"
59 In the last few years,
numerous efforts have been undertaken to improve the JCF' s
training, professionalism, equipment, as well as its
efficiency and efficacy. The JDF and the JCF have a history
of cooperation and joint operations.
E. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States plays a crucial role for the JDF,
providing badly needed equipment and money. For example,
the new JDFCG base in the Pedro Cays was constructed
primarily with funds provided by the United States . The
base is located in a strategic sea corridor frequently
utilized by narcotraf fickers . Additionally, in the last few
58 Griffith, The Quest, 139-140
59 Ibid., 140.
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years, U.S. funds have been used to finance the dry-dock
repair of two of Jamaica's patrol boats at the U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Lastly, in December 1996, the
first class graduated from the Caribbean Regional Drug Law
Enforcement Training Center in Jamaica. The first class to
graduate from the two week course had 25 students, 13 of
whom were Jamaican, with the remaining 12 from nine other
Caribbean islands. The government of the United States
largely funded the program, which is a project of the United
Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) , and the
government of Jamaica. 60
F. JAMAICAN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
1 . Cooperative Efforts
Jamaica is a member to a host of regional and
international counternarcotic agreements. Those include:
the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)
,
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) , United
Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP)
,
Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP)
,
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),
Caribbean Law Enforcement and Intelligence Committee
(CLEIC) , and the Model Maritime Agreement with the United
60 INSCR, 190
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States. Additionally, Jamaica has entered into mutual legal
assistance treaties (MLATs) with 48 designated commonwealth
states . 61
Jamaica and the United States have a history of
cooperation in counternarcotic efforts, and continue to work
together in a variety of operations. Operation Prop Lock,
initiated in January 1995, is "an ongoing joint U . S . -Jamaican
effort that targets U.S. registered planes that attempt to
smuggle drugs from Jamaica to the United States. Once
caught, the planes are confiscated, impounded, then sold.
The profits from the seizures are used to enhance Jamaican
counternarcotic capabilities. 62
In addition to Operation Prop Lock, Jamaica actively
supports U.S. counternarcotic intelligence collection
efforts, which are crucial to successful interdiction
efforts. Jamaica is part of the Joint Information
Coordination Center ( JICC) , along with Trinidad and Tobago,
Barbados, The Dominican Republic, Belize, Grenada, and'
Guyana. The JICCs are electronically connected to the Drug
Enforcement Agency's El Paso Information Center (EPIC) .
According to the 1997 International Narcotics Strategy
61 Ibid., 192.
62 Ibid., 190. Also, Griffith, Drugs and Security, 215
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Control Report " [c] ooperation between the JCF narcotics
division and DEA' s Kingston country office remains high.
This cooperation resulted in the DEA-directed arrest of over
90 major drug traffickers in 1996, versus 86 in 1995 and
only 40 in 1994.
"
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Perhaps the most significant example of Jamaican-U. S
.
cooperation is the May 1997 signing of a maritime
counternarcotics agreement. The six-part agreement is a
significant improvement over existing agreements and
treaties. The six portions of the maritime agreement are:
shipboarding, shiprider, pursuit, entry-to-investigate,
overflight, and order-to-land. "Shipboarding" provides the
authority for the USCG to stop, board, and search foreign
vessels suspected of trafficking narcotics, while
"shiprider" allows law enforcement officials to embark on
host nation vessels, and may then authorize various law
enforcement actions. "Pursuit" authorizes U.S. assets to
pursue suspected fleeing vessels or aircraft into foreign
airspace and waters, while "entry-to-investigate" provides
authority for U.S. assets to enter foreign waters or
airspace to investigate vessels located therein, and
suspected of illicit traffic. "Overflight" and "order-to-
63 Ibid., 191
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land" grant standing authority for U.S. government assets to
fly in foreign airspace when in support of counternarcotic
operations, and to order to land in the host nation any
aircraft suspected of trafficking narcotics.
In essence, this agreement represents a comprehensive
attempt to stiffen interdiction efforts by removing the
ability of narcotraf fickers to 'escape' into territorial
waters, and also to improve interdiction efforts by
providing for near seamless hot-pursuit of suspects.
Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Lucia, and Trinidad & Tobago have signed similar six-part
model maritime agreements. 64
2 . Diplomatic Disputes
However, Jamaica does not always cooperate with the
United States; it also has a history of diplomatic conflict
with the United States. The aforementioned maritime
agreement provides a perfect illustration. While Jamaica
did in fact sign an agreement, it was not until' it had hotly
negotiated it, made bellicose statements about imposition
from the North, and tried to get the rest of the signatories
64 Unpublished State Department matrix provided during August 1997 State
Department visit.
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to renege on their agreements and renegotiate from a
position of strength as a single entity. 65
Jamaica stated that by its domestic laws it could not
allow a foreign entity to perform law enforcement activities
within its declared 200 nautical mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) . 66 Jamaica consistently cited issues of national
sovereignty and respect for its territorial waters and
airspace. However, in December 1996, the Government of
Jamaica formally withdrew its EEZ declaration, opening the
door for negotiation. After months of negotiation, a
compromise was reached, and Jamaican Prime Minister P.J.
Patterson signed the agreement. The compromise included
clauses that prevent the U.S. from randomly patrolling
Jamaican territorial waters and airspace, and from entering
those same areas without prior approval. Further, the
agreement denies diplomatic immunity, and its legal
privileges, to U.S. personnel working on counternarcotic
operations in Jamaican territory.
Throughout the negotiation process, Jamaica repeatedly
tried to persuade other Caribbean nations to join it in its
65 Interviews with State Department and Central Intelligence Agency




efforts to negotiate a single treaty for the Caribbean. 67
Only Barbados, which had not yet signed an agreement,
followed Jamaica's lead, and signed the same agreement.
However, numerous regional newspapers criticized their
governments for the agreements they signed, and for not
having negotiated an agreement that would better protect
national sovereignty. 68
In the end however, despite the political grandstanding
and negotiating, an agreement was reached, and Jamaica
continues its cooperation with the United States in
counternarcotics
.
69 Additionally, in order to implement the
agreement and enhance efforts, Jamaica changed some of its
laws, enacted new legislation, and is setting up a one-stop
agency for approving patrol and hot pursuit requests. Thus,
while Jamaica challenged the United States, and in fact
67 Interviews with State Department and Central Intelligence Agency
officials while in Washington, D.C. during the week of 28 July-01 August
1997.
58 The Trinidad and Tobago newspapers "Newsday" and "Guardian" carried
numerous articles and columns criticizing the government for signing the
agreement in its original draft form. Meanwhile the Jamaican newspaper
the "Gleaner", and "Bridgetown Daily" in Barbados, carried articles and
columns praising their governments for negotiating an agreement that
protected their countries' sovereignty, and provided for reciprocity.
69 In December 1997, Jamaica held national elections, which resulted in
a historic third term for Prime Minister P.J. Patterson. During the
time preceding the election, U. S . -Jamaican relations, as well as
Jamaican-Cuban-American relations were very significant issues.
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encouraged other countries in the Caribbean to do the same,
it signed an historic agreement that opens the door for
further cooperation throughout the region.
G. CONCLUSION
As has been shown throughout this chapter Jamaica
clearly cooperates with the United States. This is
evidenced not only by Jamaica ' s actions in the realm of
international narcotics, but also in a host of other non-
narcotics related issues. For example, Jamaica supported
the U.S. physically, and more importantly diplomatically,
when it invaded Grenada in 1983, and intervened in Haiti in
1994. However, Jamaica does not just espouse the Washington
D.C. line or provide blanket approval for all policies
originating in the United States. Numerous times in
history, over a wide array of issues, Jamaica has challenged
the United States in the diplomatic and political arenas. A
frequent point of contention between the United States and
Jamaica are issues of national sovereignty, and a perception
of imposition from big brother in the North.
This is perhaps best illustrated by the recent event of
June 1997, in which a U.S. law enforcement team aboard a
British Naval vessel boarded a Jamaican fishing vessel.
Personnel from thhe British vessel, H.M.S. Liverpool, stated
that the Jamaican vessel, the Silverdollar, was a
narcotraf ficker . Accordingly, the U.S. -British team boarded
and searched the Jamaican vessel. Instantly Jamaica
protested claiming that the vessel was in Jamaica's twelve
nautical mile territorial waters, and that the team had no
right to board the vessel. The British and the Americans
claim that the vessel was out of Jamaica's territorial
limit, and that it did have a right to board the vessel.
Jamaica diplomatically protested, and complained that
the United States and Britain had violated its sovereignty,
and that they were calling Jamaica a liar. The Silverdollar
event resulted in a great deal of grandstanding and received
extensive press throughout the Caribbean. Nonetheless, only
a few weeks later, with the issue seemingly unsolved,
Jamaica signed legislation vital to implementing the
maritime cooperation agreement
.
Without doubt, a certain degree of the difficulty
associated with both the signing of the cooperation
agreement, and the Silverdollar can be attributed to pre-
election maneuvering in Jamaica. However, a significant
amount can also be attributed to Jamaica's legitimate
concerns for its national sovereignty. Further, Jamaica has
always viewed itself as a regional leader and protector of
small states in the Caribbean. Accordingly, while Jamaica
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has traditionally received higher levels of attention from
Washington because of its size and proximity to the U.S., it
has not always guietly accepted Washington's *advice,'and in
fact, on numerous occasions has openly confronted the United
States.
In conclusion, I believe that as the United States has
been able to get Jamaica to cooperate on counternarcotics in
the past, there is a chance for further cooperation within
the region. Jamaica has signed the maritime agreement,
which could serve as a crucial stepping stone for further
regional cooperation in the war against drugs. Jamaica is
without doubt one of the toughest islands in the Caribbean
to influence, and now that it is a member of the model
maritime agreement, further cooperation should be possible.
Jamaica exerts a large degree of influence in the Caribbean,
and could serve as a direct liaison and a force to encourage




The Caribbean states realize that the nature and scope
of the narcotics problem is not just a national problem, or
even an inter-regional problem, but rather one that it is a
70 Numerous countries in the region, besides those already mentioned
that have signed the full six-part agreement, have signed portions of
the agreement, but not all of it.
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global epidemic. Consequently, it requires cooperation.
Their small size, budget, and highly limited resources
require that the region pull its resources together to
achieve a synergistic effect.
One of the primary reasons that Jamaica has continued
to cooperate with the United States, despite obvious
differences of opinion, is because they, like the United
States, recognize that they cannot beat narcotraf fickers by
themselves. In other words, they view the inevitable
infringements on their sovereignty and pride that may result
by closely cooperating with the United States as an
acceptable price to pay, given the size and nature of the
threat. Further, in dealing with the United States, as
evidenced above, there is room for negotiation.
Narcotraf fickers and the powerful interests they represent
pay no such respect to the national sovereignty of a nation,
or its population. The implication of this is that the
possibility exists for further cooperation on
counternarcotics throughout the Caribbean.
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IV. TESTING THE WATERS
Cooperation requires that the actions of
separate individuals or organizations-which are
not in pre-existent harmony-be brought into
conformity with one another through a process of
negotiation, which is often referred to as ^policy
coordination' . 71
A. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
In the previous chapters I have shown that cooperation
on counternarcotics has already taken place and continues to
take place. The existence of "ship-rider" agreements with
numerous countries of the region, specifically the countries
of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, which
have all signed the full six-part multi maritime agreement,
signals the presence of widespread cooperation. However, I
believe that the potential for further cooperation now
exists
.
In After Hegemony , Robert 0. Keohane states that
international regimes reflect patterns of cooperation, as
well as those of discord over time. Therefore, focusing on
regimes leads one to examine long-term patterns of behavior.
Additionally, it has been said that regimes rarely are
formed out of chaos, rather, they arise from situations of
71 Keohane, After Hegemony, 51
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existing relationships. In other words, the formation of
international regimes takes time; it is not a single
iteration process, but rather an ongoing series of
processes
.
The relations between the U.S. and the Caribbean have
existed (and been developed) over a long period of time.
They have not always been the best, certainly they have not
been symmetrical, nor always in the best interests of one
another. Yet, certainly it can be said that each has played
important roles in the history and policies of the other.
Through the years, the two entities have existed in close
proximity, developing multiple channels of communication and
interaction across an array of issues: governmental,
societal, and economic in nature. In the post-Cold War era,
free from the ideological struggles of the East-West
conflict, the United States and the Caribbean have the
opportunity to interact and grow even closer.
1 . Regime Definitions
According to Roger Tooze, there are three primary
definitions of regimes. They start with John Ruggie's broad
definition, generally considered to be the first, with
perhaps 'a more limited definition at the other end of the
spectrum adopted more recently, and Stephen Krasner's in the
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middle. 72 Ruggie ' s definition postulates that regimes exist
in every substantive issue area where regularity in behavior
exists. The second definition, by Krasner says, "regimes
are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international
relations." 73 The third, and most useful definition,
according to Tooze, sees regimes as multilateral
arrangements among nations which seek to regulate state
actions in a given issue area. The most effective regimes,
and the most useful regime analysis, are those that focus




2. Why Regimes Exist
According to Keohane, regimes exist to facilitate the
making of specific cooperative agreements among
governments. 75 An important point to note about regimes is
72 Roger Tooze, "Regimes and International Cooperation" from A.J.R.
Groom and Paul Taylor ed, Frameworks For International Cooperation (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 204.
73 Stephen Krasner as quoted by Roger Tooze in "Regimes and
International Cooperation", 204.
74 Roger Tooze, "Regimes and International Cooperation", 212.
75 Keohane, After Hegemony, 62.
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that they do not require harmony, nor do they require the
absence of conflict. In other words, cooperation and
regimes can exist through conflict, and do not require an
unattainable state of complete harmony. Perhaps their only
real requirement is a convergence amongst the member states
upon an issue area. That is to say that those states
realize that altering their policies to facilitate
cooperation on a certain issue is in their national
interest
.
When states do a cost and benefit analysis and come to
the conclusion that cooperating on a specific issue furthers
their national interests, then that is a sufficient
motivation to cooperate, as states seek to advance their
national interests where possible. Each state's motivations
need not be the same, they need not contribute equally, nor
be equal in size and power. As such, regimes can be made up
of a hegemone and smaller states, which is the situation
that exists with the U.S. and Caribbean. According to
Keohane, " [I] ntergovernmental cooperation takes place when
the policies actually followed by one government are
regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of
66




Following this logic, it is likely that regimes will
become more and more prevalent in the New World order. With
the emergence of Samuel Huntington's "third wave", and the
well documented spread of democracy, as well as the
emergence of the global economy, there will likely be more
convergence on policy issues. 77 This convergence will
encourage the development of more regimes, as ultimately
regimes exist to facilitate cooperation and reduce discord.
B . INDICATORS
Having established that international regimes exist to
facilitate cooperation among states, and further that they
do not arise out of chaos, rather they are built upon one
another, the next step is to test the potential for an
explicit counternarcotics regime between the island nations
of the Caribbean and the United States. In approaching this
task, I have chosen three key indicators for the Caribbean,
and two indicators for the United States. I believe that
based on the breadth and importance of these indicators, it
76 Keohane, After Hegemony, 52.
77 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
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can be said that if in fact these situations do exist, then
further cooperation may be possible. Should these
indicators exist, it will demonstrate that cooperation is in
the interests of all parties, and that they in fact realize
this and have begun to foster further cooperation.
The first Caribbean indicator is the realization by the
island nations that they have 'a domestic drug problem
stemming from the dangers of drug trafficking and
consumption, and the resultant problems associated with
them. Further, as a result of this recognition, the
governments have developed a will to stop the trafficking
and abuse of narcotics. The second indicator is actual
steps taken to demonstrate this will against drugs, that is,
concrete actions against drugs. The third, and last
indicator, is a demonstration by the islands that further
cooperation is not only necessary, but also desired.
The United States' indicators are twofold. The first
is the existence of a national and governmental will to
further the level of cooperation in counternarcotics,
specifically in the critical transit zones of the Caribbean.
The second indicator is the concrete actions that the U.S.
government has taken to both encourage and improve the level
of cooperation on counternarcotics in that same region. If
it can be demonstrated that the aforementioned indicators do
68
in fact exist, then I believe that the potential for
widespread cooperation will have been shown to exist. The
aforementioned indicators to be tested are shown below in
Table 4.1
Table 4.1
Potential for a Counternarcotics Regime
























C. THE CARIBBEAN: INDICATOR ONE
The first indicator that is to be tested is the
recognition by the Caribbean that they have a domestic drug
problem, and that they realize they must take actions
against drugs. As was shown in Chapter III (Jamaican Case
Study), there exists a significant drug problem in Jamaica.
This problem has been translated into increased levels of
domestic violence, the formation of dangerous and well armed
Posses associated with the trafficking of illicit narcotics,
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a dramatic rise in the crime rate, and an increase in the
number of patients being treated at drug clinics and
hospitals. If this situation existed only in Jamaica, that
would hardly demonstrate a drug problem throughout the
region. However, that simply is not the case. The
situation in Jamaica is present in many islands of the
region.
The link between increasing drug use and crime is most
visible in those transit states typically associated with
drug trafficking: The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts-Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. In 1995, Puerto Rico had the highest
per capita murder rate in the United States, 64 percent of
which were drug related. In just one short year the number
of murders increased by 188 from 680 to 868, with 80 percent
of them being drug related. 78 According to Professor
Ivelaw Griffith, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
has said that 75-80 percent of their murders in 1996 were
drug related. 79 The Port of Spain prison in Trinidad and
Tobago was built to hold 250 inmates. In 1994, its daily
78 Griffith, Drugs and Security, 2.
79 Ibid. , 122.
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average was 1,100. Most of these inmates were serving
sentences related to drug offenses. 80
In 1994, the U.S. State Department announced that St.
Vincent and the Grenadines were the Caribbean's second
largest producers of marijuana, while the largest, Jamaica,
is geographically thirty times the size of St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. 81 The 1997 INSCR, said that production,
consumption, and trafficking in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines continues to expand. Additionally, many of the
islands not typically associated with trafficking are making
large busts of marijuana, cocaine, crack, and heroin.
As a result of the increases in crime associated with
drug use, the tourism industry in many countries has
suffered as well, which is a serious problem for their tiny
fragile economies. The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago are
all said to have suffered losses in their respective tourism
industries as a result of image problems from drugs.
The above examples were all from primary transit
states. However, the problems run much deeper than that.




considered to be major illicit drug-transit countries.
Simultaneously, the Netherlands Antilles was added to the
list of countries considered to be potentially significant
drug-transit countries. 82 Further, according to the INSCR,
the use of cocaine in Aruba is increasing at an "alarming
rate." 83 Crack use in the Netherlands Antilles is reported
to be growing at an "alarming rate" as well, as is the level
of petty crime associated with drug abuse. 84
In Barbados, the availability and use of drugs in
schools has increased so significantly that the Minister of
Education proposed that teachers be allowed to search
students for drugs and weapons. 85 Like many of the other
islands of the Eastern Caribbean, drug use, specifically
cocaine and crack, is on the rise in Grenada. St. Lucia is
said to be plagued by a significant cocaine and marijuana
consumption problem which, as in most of the rest of the
region, has given rise to the level of violent crime. 86
President William Clinton, Letter from the President to the
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committees on Appropriations
and International Relations and The Senate Committees on Appropriations







On February 13, 1998, Wrenford Ferrance, Antigua's top
counternarcotics figure, was nearly assassinated while
driving his car. In 1995 in Trinidad, a former attorney
general was assassinated in front of his home. Both crimes,
although officially unsolved, were blamed on drug lords.
The list of crime and drug abuse problems could go on for
pages. The problems plague the entire region, and are only
getting worse.
The translation of the drug problem into a governmental
will against the trafficking of illicit narcotics began
about a decade ago when it was realized that it was no
longer simply a supply and demand issue involving only South
America and the U.S. Rather, it was realized that the
scourge of drugs had evolved into not only a hemispheric
problem, but a global one as well.
The best examples of governmental will are the numerous
statements by individual leaders and regional organizations
declaring drugs and drug trafficking threats to the
sovereignty and legitimacy of regional governments. For
example, in 1996 the leaders of CARICOM issued the following
statement: "Heads of Government recognized that narco-
trafficking and its associated evils of money laundering,
gun smuggling, corruption of public officials, criminality,
and drug abuse constitute the major security threat to the
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entire Caribbean today (emphasis, mine)." 87 Perhaps an
even stronger signal is the following quote from the West
Indies Commission:
Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in
[Caribbean] countries than the drug problem, and
nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional
governments more...It is a many-layered danger. ..On top of
all this lie the implications for governance itself-at
the hands of both external agencies engaged in
international interdiction, and the drug barons
themselves - the x dons' of the modern Caribbean - who
threaten governance from within. 88
These high level statements are only two of a growing
number, but they indicate the very real threat that the
region feels. This realization has been translated into the
creation of numerous organizations and the signing of a
large number of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Many of
these have been mentioned in the two preceding chapters,
however, a few deserve further attention. On a symbolic
level, the effect that every nation in the region, including
Cuba, has signed the 1988 United Nations Convention against
the trafficking of illicit narcotics, cannot be overstated.
As recently as mid-1995, numerous countries in the region
87 Communique, Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean
Community, Barbados, December 16, 1996, as quoted in Griffith, Drugs and
Security, 3.
88 West Indian Commission, Time For Action: The Report of the West
Indian Commission. (Black Rock, Barbados, 1992), 1.
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including Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis,
and Trinidad and Tobago had not ratified that convention,
but now everyone has. This perhaps shows a recognition that
the individual countries realize that their tiny islands are
being negatively affected by drugs, and now they are ready
to do something about it.
Another highly significant effort is the signing of
the six-part multi maritime agreement by all the members of
CARICOM. Given some of the countries involved, namely
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and their importance in the
drug trade, the enormity and importance of this diplomatic
triumph should not be downplayed. Without doubt, it shows a
regional awareness of the scourge of the drug trade, while
simultaneously indicating a commitment to battling it.
1 . Indicator Two
The second indicator, the level of actual concrete
action, is perhaps the easiest to measure because it is more
than just statements, while simultaneously being the hardest
to put into perspective. Throughout this thesis, numbers
have been given on the size and scope of the drug trade, as
well as those of acres and plants eradicated, arrests made,
drugs seized, and so forth. Yet, given the size of the
problem, and its secretive nature, it is tough at times to
75
put these numbers into perspective. However, it can be said
that more countries than ever are cooperating with the U.S.
on counternarcotics . Countries in the Caribbean that used
to resist implementing eradication policies are now doing
so, albeit slowly. Nations that used to deny the U.S. hot-
pursuit into their sovereign waters and airspace are now
permitting it. Many of the islands had either no, or very
weak legislation against drug use and narcotics trafficking.
However, that currently is changing. 89 Countries that used
to be openly corrupt have cracked down on corruption,
implementing new legislation and pursuing crimes of illegal
personal enrichment.
Specifically, on 29 March 1996, the member countries of
the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption. Adopted at the third plenary session, the anti-
corruption convention is the first of its kind in the world.
In the document the members state that they are "convinced
that corruption undermines the legitimacy of public
institutions and strikes at society, moral order and
justice..." 90 The document further states that the members
89 For a comprehensive list of recent and ongoing legal reforms see
Griffith, Drugs and Security, Chapter 4.
90 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption. Adopted at the third plenary session held on March 29,
1996, 1.
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are concerned about the links between corruption and
proceeds generated by illicit narcotics, and state that they
are determined to make every effort to punish and eradicate
corruption
.
Another example of concrete action is in the status of
regional counterdrug forces. Many are being upgraded in
either size or eguipment, frequently with U.S. Department of
State INL funds. In January 1996, the Netherlands Antilles,
Aruba, and the Netherlands formed a joint Coast Guard to
improve counternarcotics efforts in and around the




However, despite the attractiveness of some of the
mind-boggling numbers such as numbers of arrests, drugs
confiscated, and hectares eradicated, perhaps a better
measure of effectiveness is to look at some of the
interactions and meetings taking place. The biggest success
is the monthly meeting of the Caribbean Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Committee (CLEIC) . The CLEIC meets once a
month at the U.S. Coast Guard base in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Numerous high-level counterdrug officials and officers
attend this meeting from the United States, British Virgin
91 inscr, 165.
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Islands, Caribbean Commonwealth Islands, French Islands, and
Netherlands Antilles, and attendance is reportedly
increasing monthly. The meetings have begun to facilitate
better flows of communication from both the island to the
U.S. perspective, and vice versa, but also from the island
to island perspective as well. As a result of these
meetings, more and more intelligence has begun to be passed
both formally, and informally through case officer to case
officer discussions. 92
A second example highlighting the commitment and
improvements at the tactical level are the annual meetings
of the Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies
(HONLEA) . HONLEA is a subsidiary body of the United
Nations. Its member states in the Caribbean are: Antigua
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and
Tobago. France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the
United States are also member states. Additionally,
Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico,
92 Information obtained from a phone interview with Office of Naval
Intelligence employee Champee Hartwell, on February 17, 1998. Subject
is also an officer in the Coast Guard reserves who recently returned
from 11 months of working counternarcotic issues in Puerto Rico.
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Turks and Caicos Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are
all associate members.
For eight years the member countries, associate
members, and metropolitan powers have gotten together and
discussed individual and regional efforts in an attempt to
improve upon existing efforts. The meetings have focused
upon trafficking trends, the changing structures and
methodology of drug-trafficking organizations, investigative
techniques, and managing undercover operations. 93
At the national level, a variety of treaties have been
signed and declarations issued stating the intent of the
region and individual countries to fight the scourge of
drugs. For example, in October 1996, the OAS Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS-CICAD) passed a
resolution establishing an anti-drug strategy in the
hemisphere. According to the OAS, the strategy
"... [R] epresents a fresh commitment to international
cooperation to combat the drug problem based on the
93 UN Information Services, Drug Law Enforcement in Latin America and
Caribbean To Be Discussed at UN Meeting in Buenos Aires, 12 September
1997, 1. (UN website). In addition to the aforementioned members,
Mexico and most of Central and South America are members as well.
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principle of shared responsibility and the need for a policy
that balances preventative and law enforcement measures." 94
However, there is more going on in Caribbean
counternarcotics than just meetings with their requisite
declarations, statements, and treaties. At the tactical
level there are numerous annual combined operations
involving not only the United 'States, but also numerous
regional counternarcotic forces. For example, Caribe
Venture is a Coast Guard sponsored series of recurrent
multinational operations in the Eastern Caribbean.
Participants extend legal authority to the counter-drug
forces of other nations that permit entry and pursuit of
suspects through sovereign waters and air space. The four
operations of 1996 were widely participated in, with
partners including: United Kingdom dependent territories,
the Netherlands Antilles, French West Indies, Dominican
Republic, Antigua & Barbuda, St Kitts & Nevis, Anguilla &
Montserrat, and Dominica. 95 •
While Caribe Venture is a great example, it is by no
means the only multinational counternarcotics operation
94 In January of 1997, the OAS-CICAD had 31 member-nations. Organization
of American States, Annual Report-Inter American Commission, 1997, 2.
Obtained via the OAS website. Located at: www.oas.org
95 INCSR, 49. In addition to the aforementioned partners of Caribe
Venture, other RSS members participated in operations conducted in the
vicinity of their territorial seas and airspace.
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annually undertaken in the Caribbean. Other operations
include Operation Gallant Shield in the French West Indies,
HALCON in the Dominican Republic, OPBAT in the Bahamas and
Florida Straits, and Operation Proplock in Jamaica. 96
Combined operations between the U.S. and Caribbean
counternarcotic forces provide an excellent opportunity for
practical training for all forces involved, improving the
indigenous capability of regional forces. Additionally, the
size, scope, and level of participation in the operations
show a growing resolve to combat drugs and their dangers.
2 . Indicator Three
The third Caribbean indicator is the continued and
growing level of diplomatic efforts aimed at advancing
cooperation throughout the region. At the conclusion of the
1994 Miami Summit, the 34 democracies of the Western
Hemisphere issued the Declaration of Miami, which stated
that there was a "...need for an integrated, balanced and
coordinated approach that will be capable, with full respect
for national sovereignty, of effectively confronting all
96 Ibid., 49-50
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manifestations of the illicit drug problem." 97 The
declaration laid out four steps that were considered
necessary in order to develop a comprehensive hemispheric
strategy to counter all the dangers of the illicit narcotics
trade. The fourth "work area" was to implement
international coordination actions in order to interdict the
trafficking of narcotics throughout the region. 98
An additional call for enhanced regional cooperation
came from the OAS when they adopted the "Declaration
Affirming Respect for the Personality, Sovereignty, and
Independence of States" during the second plenary session on
2 June 1997. 99 In this document the OAS states that the
countries of the Americas face a common enemy in illicit
drug trafficking, and that to effectively counter it
requires the willing cooperation and collaboration of all
states. Further, it urges members to cooperate to wage a
concerted effort against illicit drugs in accordance with
the United Nations Convention against illicit trafficking of
drugs (1988), and for those countries who had not yet done
97 Organization of American States, Hemispheric Security and the Fight




99 Organization of American States, Declaration Affirming Respect for
the Personality, Sovereignty, and Independence of States, June 1997, 1
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so to become parties to that convention. 100 Clearly it can
be seen from these selections that the OAS believes that
further and deepened cooperation is the only way that any
success will be achieved in the war against drugs.
The U.S. and Caribbean Summit, which took place in
Bridgetown, Barbados on 10 May 1997, is another example of
the Caribbean's intent to further cooperation. According to
Beverly Eighmy, the Caribbean Program Officer of the INL
Bureau at the U.S. State Department, the summit represented
a great leap forward towards further cooperation. 101 During
the summit, the Bridgetown Declaration of Principles was
adopted by all countries in attendance. The declaration is
a two part action plan, with the first part addressing
trade, development, finances and the environment, while the
second part addresses security and justice, much of which
concerns countering narcotics.
100 As was noted earlier, all the island states of the Caribbean have
already become members of the convention.
101 Information obtained during a phone interview with Beverly B.
Eighmy, on 16 March 1998
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We recognize the need for greater
cooperation of security forces in the region to
deal with illicit drug trafficking, alien
smuggling, illegal trafficking in arms and threats
to stability. We agree that no single nation has
the ability to deal effectively with the threats
to the security of the region, and that
coordination, cooperation, and combined operations
are necessary. 102
A final example showing the desire that the region has
to advance cooperation, and the emphasis that it places upon
doing so, is the fact that the most recent Inter-American
Summit held in Santiago, Chile, focused upon advancing
cooperation in counternarcotics . Additionally, a special
three-day session of the United Nations General Assembly
will be held on 8-10 June 1998, to specifically address the
topic of international narcotics, and improving global
efforts to combat the dangers of drugs.
Although the Organization of American States is
considered at times to be a toothless tiger, and not all the
countries of the region have lived up to their obligations
in the various treaties discussed earlier, it
can nonetheless be seen that the necessity for further
cooperation has been advocated and realized by the
102 Caribbean/United States Summit, Partnership For Prosperity and
Security In The Caribbean: Bridgetown Declaration of Principles
.
Adopted 10 May, 1997, 11.
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Caribbean. 103 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has stated
that drugs and its many associated dangers represent the
greatest threat to the security of the region. Because of
this they established a Joint Committee with the United
States to further cooperation on justice and security
concerns, and have specifically already begun addressing
counternarcotics . The next section evaluates the two U.S.
indicators
.
D. THE UNITED STATES: INDICATOR ONE
The first of the two U.S. indicators is statements
concerning the necessity to further cooperation on
international counternarcotics efforts. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright clearly summarized this view when she
said "[n]o nation acting alone can defeat that threat [drug
trafficking]. We must work together to eradicate crops,
disrupt trafficking, break up cartels, and punish those who
would enrich themselves by selling poison to our
children." 104
103 During the phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, she stated that
while cooperation is improving, there are still many troubled areas.
For instance, by June 1998, all the countries of the region are supposed
to have ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption.
However, that did not occur.
104 Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, press briefing on
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997. U.S. State
Department Internet website. Located at: www.state.gov
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In his 1997 State of the Union Address, President
Clinton said that the U.S. security strategy is guided by
six strategic priorities, one of which is to "increase
cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy
borders and unilateral solutions." 105 The 1997 National
Security Strategy states that the principal security
concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature.
Stating that drug trafficking poses a serious threat to the
sovereignty, democracy, and national security of nations in
the hemisphere, the United States seeks through bilateral
and regional efforts to eliminate the scourge of drug
trafficking
.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy' s strategy
includes five goals. Two of these goals are to shield
America's borders from the drug threat, and to break both
foreign and domestic sources of supply. In this strategy
there are objectives which specifically address the need to
advance cooperation in order to achieve success in both of
these goals. 106
105 president William Clinton, National Security Strategy For a New
Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 5.
106 president William Clinton, The National Drug Control Strategy
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997).
86
Clearly it can be seen that the White House desires
further cooperation in the war against drugs. In addition
to the documents cited above, there is an exponentially
growing body of literature, documents, reports, and speeches
by U.S. politicians, intelligence agencies, military
commanders, and academics, all of which highlight the need
for further cooperation.
1 . Indicator Two
The second and final U.S. indicator concerns actual
efforts taken by the United States to advance cooperation on
counternarcotics in the Caribbean. The number of U.S. lead
initiatives to counter drugs is too numerous to address in
this chapter, so only a few will be highlighted. According
to the ONDCP, since 1992 the U.S. has signed bilateral
maritime counternarcotic agreements with 11 nations
bordering the Caribbean basin, significantly improving
cooperation
.
As described in Chapter III (Jamaican Case Study) , the
recently opened regional law enforcement training center in
Jamaica was largely funded with State Department INL funds.
Also, as a result of the aforementioned summit in
Bridgetown, the U.S. has recently transferred a series of
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C-26 aircraft and 82-foot patrol boats to the Caribbean. 107
Both are examples of action taken by the United States to
improve capabilities and cooperation in the region.
According to a statement by then-acting Commander in
Chief U.S. Southern Command, RADM Doran, multinational
cooperation on counternarcotics in the region is at an
unprecedented level, and SOUTHCOM is taking efforts to raise
that level. 108 According to RADM Doran, U.S. support for
counternarcotics in the region is formed on six pillars:
intelligence support, detection, monitoring and tracking
(DM&T), joint planning assistance teams, logistics support,
training support, and communications support. "These six
pillars work in concert to provide the crucial link to Host
Nation and U.S. successful counterdrug endgames." 109
In addition to these few specific examples, the State
Department, DOD, USCG, DEA, and a wide variety of other
organizations have spent millions of dollars, all with the
goal of improving the region's institutions and its
abilities to combat the dangers of drugs. The current
107 Phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, and United States
Information Service Fact Sheet, Caribbean Security and Narcotics
Interdiction, December 5, 1997.
108 RADM Doran, acting CINC SOUTHCOM, statement given on July 16, 1997,
before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations,
14. Obtained via the Internet.
109 Ibid., 6,
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emphasis in both the National Security Strategy and the
ONDCP's counterdrug policy, on cooperating in a true
multinational effort is an indication of the realization by
the U.S. government that the problem is too big to be
defeated alone. Additionally, it is a reflection of the
changing security environment in the post-Cold War. The
days of throwing a few million dollars at the Caribbean and
hoping the problem would go away are gone and the emphasis
placed up true cooperation are an indication of this.
The ONDCP's strategy makes the following observation
which perhaps best illustrates the United States desire to
facilitate, and advance cooperation on counternarcotics
:
The growing trend toward greater
counternarcotics cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere is creating unprecedented opportunities
for governments to eviscerate the drug threat
while promoting more cordial, productive relations
between the United States and the rest of the
region. The era in which the region's antidrug
efforts have been driven largely by a series of
distinct, bilateral initiatives between the United
States and selected Latin American and Caribbean
countries is giving way to one that increasingly
includes new multilateral approaches. The
institutions and many of the mechanisms to make
such cooperation succeed are in place or under
development. It is in our interest—and the
interests of the other countries in the region—to
enhance these institutions and accelerate the
,
multilateral process, culminating in a hemispheric
alliance against the drug threat. 110
110 United States Department of State, Enhanced Multilateral Drug
Control Cooperation: A Counternarcotics Alliance for the Hemisphere,
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I believe that because of the three Caribbean and two
U.S. indicators which I have shown to exist, the formation
of a counternarcotics regime in the region is possible. The
relationship and possible result is demonstrated in Figure
4 . 1 below.
Figure 4 .
1














Section V., 1. Obtained via the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) webpage.
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V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Just like American policy-makers and public
servants have to rethink and redesign their
attitudes towards the region, Caribbean leaders
also have to realize that the challenges of the




As has been shown throughout the preceding chapter,
cooperation between the United States and the Caribbean is
taking place at a variety of levels of the drug war, through
multiple efforts and organizations. Further, the potential
for increased cooperation exists because of the reasons that
were indicated in Chapter IV.
However, to say that currently there is cooperation is
not to say that there are not problems as well. Corruption
continues to be one of the biggest problems in the region.
Without doubt, not all of the countries have lived up to all
of the agreements to which they are party. Some countries
have yet to pass legislation implementing conventions such
as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Many
111 Holger Henke, "Between rocks and a hard place: the ' shiprider
controversy' and the question of Caribbean sovereignty", 1997, 10,
Obtained via the Internet.
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countries have either no laws, or almost no laws, forbidding
money laundering, which helps perpetuate the drug problem.
However, as was mentioned at the beginning of the
preceding chapter, cooperation is not synonymous with
harmony, nor does it require the absence of conflict.
Despite some of the aforementioned problems, there is a
higher level of cooperation than ever before. Countries
like Trinidad and Tobago are cooperating at exceptionally
high levels, and are making a difference. Because of many
of the successes in interdiction in the transit zones,
traffickers are switching their routes to less efficient
ones. Recent reporting indicates that traffickers are
changing their routes to the Eastern Caribbean and other
surreptitious and less direct routes. These new routes and
measures are being adopted as a result of successful
interdiction efforts in other islands. 112
As long as there continues to be weak links the
traffickers will always have an area to exploit. What is
needed is to replace the current myriad of complex, and at
times non-supportive, bilateral and multilateral efforts.
There needs to be a single comprehensive regime that exists
112 The trafficking changes to the Eastern Caribbean have been
discussed in many books, newspaper articles, and in interviews conducted
by the author.
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to counter the multifaceted dangers of illicit narcotics.
Such a regime is not only in the U.S. national interest, it
is also in the interest of the tiny democracies that
constitute the Caribbean. Such a regime would not replace
national efforts, it would merely make them more efficient
and effective, the value of which cannot be overstated given
the miniscule size of the Caribbean' s budgets and
counternarcotics forces.
1 . Justification
Robert Keohane said that international regimes are
largely self-interest organizations and that they exist to
further a country's national interest. I think that the
case has been made showing that cooperating on
counternarcotics is in the Caribbean's national interest and
that more importantly, the leaders of the region think so as
well
.
Andrew Axline argues that:
Generally, it can be postulated that a given
member state will support a regional proposal that
satisfies its own national goals better, or at a
lower cost than an alternative proposal, through a
simple calculation of the relative costs and
benefits of different options. 113
113 Axline, Regional Cooperation, 23
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Axline is describing a situation similar to the one
which now exists in the Caribbean. I believe that the
countries of the Caribbean that have signed multilateral
agreements with the United States, and that have deepened
their cooperative efforts throughout the region, have done
so because it advances their national interests at a lower
cost than that of not doing so at all. In other words, the
benefits outweigh the costs. The drug problem is simply too
big and too threatening to be dealt with unilaterally, and
both the United States and the Caribbean are coming to this
pragmatic realization.
From this situation, the logical progression is towards
a situation of further integrated and coordinated
cooperation throughout the region. I believe that I have
shown that an area of overlap exists in the national
interests of the United States and the Caribbean. This area
of overlap is the perceived threat of drugs, and it is in





The Caribbean and The United States
Convergence of National Interests
*Shaded area equals potential regime
Source: Author.
2 . Cooperation Scenarios
Lisa Martin said that there are three types of
cooperation "problems." 114 The first is coincidence,
whereby countries agree without negotiation to pursue the
same policy. There is coercion, where one country has to
persuade another to follow the same policy, either by
threats, promise of rewards and benefits, or through linkage
114 Martin, Coercive Cooperation, 25-26.
95
to other issues. Finally, there is coadjustment , a
situation that exists when neither country would pursue the
policy alone, but will if the other country does because
then they both benefit.
These three scenarios can be used as a tool to
understand how further cooperation in the form of an
explicit regime focusing upon the countering of narcotics
could be formed between the U.S. and the Caribbean. Axline
said that regional policies not viewed by some countries to
be advancing their national interests, at a lower cost, must
if necessary be linked to other policies in order to arrive
at agreement. Where possible, this should be avoided, but
as one of Martin's three "problems," the coercive method
exists for scenarios such as this. Accordingly, there is
more than one path towards cooperation.
Where linkage is necessary, international organizations
can play a critical role because they can raise the cost of
defection from a regime, while simultaneously increasing the
credibility of the linkage as well. 115 In the same vein,
international organizations such as the United Nations Drug
Control Program, and the Organization of American States
115 Ibid., 39
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play an important role in facilitating cooperation, whatever
form it takes.
B. NEXT MILLENNIUM'S DRUG STRATEGY... A POLICY PRESCRIPTION
In forming America' s counterdrug strategy for the next
millennium, the United States occupies a unique position.
It is the region's strongest power, as well as the globe's
only superpower, while simultaneously it is the world'
s
largest consumer of illicit narcotics. The U.S. should take
every precaution to ensure that the next millennium' s drug
strategy is not unilateral and asymmetrically imposed. An
honest effort must be placed upon respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Caribbean. The
United States should negotiate and engage in diplomacy in
good faith, respecting that the leaders of the Caribbean
answer to domestic constituencies as well.
Given the current political stability and ideological
conformity throughout the region (except Cuba) , the growing
interdependence of the U.S. and Caribbean relationship, and
the regional acceptance of the threat posed by drugs, a
truly comprehensive drug strategy is within reach. Despite
all the evidence pointing to the potential for increased
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cooperation, the road ahead is not easy. Perhaps Michael
Morris stated it the best:
The policy dilemma posed by the drug trade
for small Caribbean states is that individually
they cannot control the drug trade but that a
U . S . -controlled, anti-drug strategy for the region
may impinge on national sovereignty. For the
United States, the Caribbean challenge is to shape
a strategy for interdiction of drug-transit




Although not easy, the answer lies in the formation of
an explicit counternarcotic ' s regime encompassing the United
States and the island Caribbean. The formation of such a
regime would advance the national interests of both the U.S.
as well as those of the Caribbean, while simultaneously
encouraging the more efficient and effective use of scarce
resources. I believe that for the reasons I have detailed
above the formation of such a regime is now possible and
necessary.
The U.S. and Caribbean should unite in a regional
approach, drug traffickers respect no national boundaries,
and the longer there is a failure to truly cooperate, the
more they will exploit their advantages. The failure to
establish such a regime threatens the legitimacy, efficacy,
116 Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 141.
98
sovereignty, and ultimately the stability of the Caribbean,
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